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SCHOOL FINANCING PLANS:
THE POOR GET POORER
INTRODUCTION
The educational foundations of our society are presently being
eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future
as a nation and a people .... If an unfriendly foreign power had
attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational per-
formance that exists today, we may well have viewed it as an act
of war. As it stands, we have allowed this to happen to ourselves.1
The growing societal concern over educational mediocrity can be at-
tributed, in part, to the extensive disparities in funding among local
school districts within our states.2 Under the United States educa-
tional system, localities have traditionally been responsible for funding
a significant portion of our children's education.3 The financial inequi-
ties among school districts stem from reliance on local property taxes
1. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NATION AT
RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (Washington D.C.: U.S. De-
partment of Education, April 1983). In 1981, T.H. Bell, the U.S. Secretary of Educa-
tion, created the National Commission on Excellence in Education. The Secretary
directed the Commission to assess the quality of education in American schools. The
preceding is the introduction to the Commission's report. Id.
2. In New Jersey during the 1984-85 school year, the amount of funding per pupil
ranged from $4,755 per pupil in richer areas to $2,687 per pupil in poorer districts, a
difference of $2,068 per pupil. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 383 (N.J. 1990). Other
states have similar disparities. For example, in 1987, Illinois had a rich district to poor
district spending ratio of over three to one. In Texas, Ohio, and New York, the ratios
were 2.8:1, 2.8:1, and 2.6:1 respectively. Julie Kosterlitz, Schoolhouse Equality, NAT.
JOURNAL, July 21, 1990, at 1768. This difference in funding obviously has an impact
on the facilities provided students. Id. For example, in Princeton, New Jersey, there is
one computer for every eight children. Id. In Camden, however, there is one computer
for every fifty-eight children. Id.
3. U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE
STRUCTURE OF STATE AID TO ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 1 (1990)
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to support our educational systems.4 Predictably, the ability to raise
revenue varies according to the property values within a school dis-
trict.5 Districts with lower property values must tax at a higher rate in
order to obtain revenue equivalent to richer districts taxing at a lower
percentage. 6 As a result, two school districts within a state can tax at
the same rate yet yield significantly different revenues.7
During the educational awareness period of the 1980's, educators
focused their attention on improving student performance, but ignored
the inequities of local school budgets.' During this time, however, liti-
gants challenged the wide disparities existing in their school financing
programs. These litigants were successful in recent state supreme
court decisions handed down in Montana,9 Kentucky,'
° New Jersey, I I
[hereinafter THE STRUCTURE OF STATE AID]. See infra note 60 for a breakdown of the
relationship between the state, local, and federal government in education spending.
4. Id. at 11-17. States have placed the majority of the revenue raising task on locali-
ties. In order to raise the necessary funds, localities turn to the one tax that is not
dominated by both the federal and state governments, the property tax. Id. at 16.
5. See infra notes 21, 128, 135, and 140-41 for examples of the disparity in tax bases
for a given locality and its effects.
6. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989). The
Edgewood court referred to this dilemma as the "cycle of poverty." Id. In order to
compete with wealthier school districts and meet minimum accreditation requirements,
poorer districts have to charge a higher tax to offset their low tax base. Id. This poses
several difficulties. First, higher tax rates will hinder economic growth. Id. If a district
has high tax rates, it has trouble drawing new business and industry into the area. Id.
Without these high value developments, it is difficult to improve the quality of living
within the district. Thus, the high tax rates renders property-poor districts unable to
improve their property values. Id.
In addition, a district with low property values can only impose a certain maximum
taxing level in order to avoid oppressiveness. The Abbott court labeled this problem
"municipal overburden." 575 A.2d at 393. A higher percentage of the property base is
needed to raise the revenue to provide the community with its necessities. Id. These
necessities include police, fire, and waste disposal services that richer districts can pay
for with lower rates on higher property values. Id. Because poor districts must impose
high tax burdens for these municipal services, they are reluctant to raise taxes for school
purposes. Id.
7. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of inequities in tax
rates.
8. Kosterlitz, supra note 2, at 1768. See also THE STRUCTURE OF STATE AID,
supra note 3, at vii.
9. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989). See infra
notes 103-26 for a discussion of the Helena decision.
10. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). See infra




Part I of this paper focuses on the history and evolution of school
finance reform litigation. Part II discusses three recent state court de-
cisions signaling a new approach to evaluate school finance reform.
Part III concentrates on two amended funding plans seeking judicial
approval for a second time after courts declared them unconstitutional.
Finally, Part IV attempts to interpret the impact of these judicial deci-
sions and predict what the future may hold for school finance reform.
I. HISTORY OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
Initially, opponents of school financing systems attacked the inequi-
ties in school funding on the basis of the United States Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause.1 3 Litigants argued that the substantial fund-
ing disparities caused by property wealth variance among school dis-
tricts violated a fundamental right to education.14 Early cases in
Virginia 5 and Illinois16 were unsuccessful because the courts were un-
willing to determine the appropriate level of expenditures on the basis
of student need. 7 In later cases, reform lawyers launched what is now
11. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). See infra notes 157-89 for a discus-
sion of the Abbott decision.
12. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.
1989) and Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood II), 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.
1991). See infra notes 136-56 and 190-214 for a discussion of Edgewood I and
Edgewood II.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part that: "No State shall... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." See generally Wil-
liam E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Deci-
sions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUc. 219,
222-25 (1990) (describing the first wave of public school finance reformation) [hereinaf-
ter Thro, The Third Wave].
14. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1973).
15. Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D.Va. 1969), aff'd mem., 397 U.S.
44 (1970).
16. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D.IlI. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nom.,
McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
17. Betsy Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation: A Commen-
tary, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1099, 1100-01. The courts in both Burruss and Mclnnis ex-
pressed hesitancy in two regards. First, the courts had difficulty setting an appropriate
constitutional standard to determine a violation. Burruss, 310 F. Supp. at 574; McIn-
nis, 293 F. Supp. at 335. Second, the courts believed that this task was better suited to
the legislature. "IT]he courts have neither the knowledge, nor the means, nor the power
to tailor the public moneys to fit the varying needs of these students throughout the
State." Burruss, 310 F. Supp. at 574.
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known as the "fiscal neutrality" theory.1 8 This theory did not require
the courts to deal with specific student needs, but with the equality of
dollar output.9 This development led to the first successful decision
striking down a school financing plan under the federal Equal Protec-
tion Clause in Serrano v. Priest.2"
In Serrano, the plaintiffs argued that educational opportunities avail-
able to children in poorer districts were substantially inferior to the
opportunities for other children in the state.21 These inequities alleg-
edly violated the requirements of the United States Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court determined that "the distinctive and priceless
function of education in our society" mandated that education be
treated as a fundamental right.2 3 In addition, the court found that the
18. Levin, supra note 17, at 1101. See also William E. Thro, Note, To Render
Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance
Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. RnV. 1639, 1650 (1989) [hereinafter Thro, To Render
Them Safe].
19. Levin, supra note 17, at 1101. This theory did not involve judicial intervention,
but merely "focused on freeing the tie between the level of expenditures and district
property wealth." Id.
20. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
21. Id. at 1244. In Los Angeles County, for example, the Baldwin Park School
District, where plaintiffs attend school, spent $577 per pupil on education during 1968-
1969. On the other hand, the Pasadena School District spent $840 per student and the
Beverly Hills School District spent $1,231 per child. Id. at 1248. The Serrano court
reasoned that this disparity was directly attributable to the local property values. Id.
In Baldwin Park, the property value per child equalled $3,706 while the values totalled
$13,706 and $50,885 in Pasadena and Beverly Hills respectively. Id.
22. Id. at 1249.
23. Id. at 1258. The court stressed the indispensable role of education in modern
society. Id. at 1258-59. The court reasoned that education played a vital role in deter-
mining a person's chances for "economic and social success in our competitive society."
Id. at 1255-56. The court also found that "education is a unique influence on a child's
development as a citizen and his participation in political and community life ....
[E]ducation is the lifeline of both the individual and society." Id. at 1256.
The court expressed five reasons why it believed education was a fundamental right:
1. Education creates opportunities for individuals to compete successfully in today's
marketplace regardless of a deprived childhood. Id. at 1258-59.
2. Everyone benefits from an education. Its application extends to every facet of
life. Id. at 1259.
3. Individuals are in school for a good portion of their life - ten to thirteen years.
"Few other government services have such sustained, intensive contact with the recipi-
ent." Id.
4. Education has a great impact on molding the personalities of today's youth. Id.
5. The state of California has reinforced the importance of education by requiring
attendance until a certain age and assigning districts and specific schools. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol42/iss1/19
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taxing system classified its recipients on the basis of wealth and there-
fore discriminated against a suspect class.24 The court applied strict
scrutiny analysis and struck down the financing plan because it was not
necessary to achieve a "compelling state interest." 25
Several courts subsequently followed Serrano and overturned their
state financing plans under the federal Equal Protection Clause.26 This
argument's success came to an abrupt halt, however, when the United
States Supreme Court announced its decision in San Antonio Independ-
ent School District v. Rodriguez.27 In Rodriguez, school reformists ar-
gued that the Texas system's reliance on local property taxes favored
the rich because disparate property wealth among school districts
caused school funding and educational inequalities.2" The district
court agreed, holding the plan unconstitutional under the federal Equal
Protection Clause.29 The United States Supreme Court granted certio-
24. 487 P.2d at 1250. Because over one-half of the money used for education is
raised through local property taxes, the court reasoned that those districts with low
property values were unable to raise the revenue that affluent districts could raise with
minimal tax rates. Id.
The defendant argued that even if the system did classify by wealth, the unequal
treatment was not intentional. Id. at 1253. The court rejected this argument as illogi-
cal. Id. The court reasoned that previous United States Supreme Court decisions strik-
ing down wealth classifications concentrated on the discriminatory effect of the
regulation, regardless of the purpose. Id. Moreover, the discrimination in Serrano was
the direct result of government action. The state government enacted the funding
scheme and also determined the district boundary lines. Id.
25. Id. at 1263. In applying a strict scrutiny analysis, the court placed the burden
of proof on the state to establish "'not only that it has a compelling interest which
justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its
purpose.'" Id. at 1249 (citations omitted). The government articulated its compelling
interest as strengthening and encouraging local control of public education. Id. at 1260.
The court, however, found that the interest could not withstand the requisite strict scru-
tiny because the law "deals intimately with education [and] obviously touches upon a
fundamental interest." Id. at 1263.
26. See, e.g., Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068, 1079 (D. Md. 1972) (subjecting
the state financing plan to the "reasonable basis test" under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Rodriquez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F.
Supp. 280, 285 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (invalidating the state fund-
ing plan on the ground that the plan discriminates on the basis of wealth and thereby
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
27. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
28. Id. at 19, 23.
29. 337 F. Supp. 280, 285 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Texas
district court held that the Texas system discriminated on the basis of wealth by al-
lowing richer districts to provide a higher quality education despite a lower tax rate. Id.
The court found that the state failed to provide a compelling state interest that is pro-
1992]
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rari to determine the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.3"
The Rodriguez Court first addressed whether the alleged classifica-
tion on the basis of wealth constituted a "suspect class."31 The Court
found that the financing system did not discriminate against any sus-
pect class, 32 reasoning that the disparity in school districts' property
values did not directly correlate to discrimination against the poor.33
The Court stated that the residents in each district had "none of the
traditional indicia of suspectness, ' ' 34 finding the class "large, diverse
and amorphous," unified merely by the fact that they reside in districts
with less taxable income than other districts. 35 The Court further
stated that the alleged disadvantaged class did not suffer any absolute
deprivation of an educational opportunity. 36 The Supreme Court rea-
moted by the wealth classification. Id. at 284. Therefore, the court held that the plan
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 285.
30. 411 U.S. at 6.
31. Id. at 17. The Rodtiguez Court criticized previous lower court decisions on
school financing as using a "simplistic process of analysis" in finding wealth discrimina-
tion. Id. at 18-19. The Court found that these courts simply looked to the fact that
children in poorer districts received less expensive educations than those in richer dis-
tricts. Id. at 19. On that basis, the lower courts concluded that the funding schemes
"discriminat[ed] on the basis of wealth." Id.
The Court emphasized that this simplistic analysis ignored two threshold questions.
Id. First, the significance of the difficulty in defining or identifying the class of "poore
in ordinary equal protection terms; and second, "whether the relative - rather than the
absolute - nature of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence." Id.
32. Id. at 28.
33. Id. at 23. The Court had difficulty assuming that because a district had lower
property values, it necessarily contained an abundance of poor persons. Id. "[Tihere is
no basis on the record in this case for assuming that the poorest people ... are concen-
trated in the poorest districts." Id. The Court cited an exhaustive Connecticut study
that concluded "[iut is clearly incorrect ... to contend that the 'poor' live in 'poor'
districts .... Thus, the major factual assumption of Serrano - that the educational
financing system discriminates against the 'poor' - is simply false in Connecticut." Id.
(citing Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles
and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303, 1328-29 (1972)).
34. 411 U.S. at 28. The Court found that this class did not embody the traditional
factors used to evaluate a suspect class: "the class is not saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 23-24. The Court noted that the plaintiffs did not allege that the Texas
students received no public education; rather, the plaintiffs argued that the students in
poorer districts were receiving a lower quality education than students in wealthier dis-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol42/iss1/19
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soned that although this class may receive a lesser quality of education,
relative inequality does not create a constitutional violation.3 7 The
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause, in situations involving
wealth, does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages.38
Next, in addressing whether education is a fundamental right, the
Supreme Court expressly discounted the relative societal significance of
education and focused on whether the Constitution explicitly or im-
plicitly guarantees the right to an education.39 The Court found that
education is not a fundamental right," refusing to raise education to a
fundamental level simply because of its elevated societal importance.41
tricts. Id. at 23. The Court acknowledged that an absolute deprivation of education
may be an impairment of a fundamental right. Id. at 37. "Even if it were conceded that
some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to
the meaningful exercise of either right [here the Court is referring to the right to speak
or vote], we have no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in
Texas provide an education that falls short." Id. at 36-37.
37. Id. at 24.
38. 411 U.S. at 24.
39. Id. at 33-34.
40. Id. at 35. The majority recognized the importance of education in our society,
stating:
Education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic so-
ciety. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms.
Id. at 29-30 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
41. 411 U.S. at 35. The Court stressed the well-founded notion that heightened
social importance does not alter the Court's strict scrutiny analysis. Id. The majority
was concerned about becoming a 'super-legislature' merely reacting to the current socie-
tal views on an issue. Id. at 41. The Court ignored this temptation and stated that it
must comply with the constitutional demands and nothing further. Id.
The plaintiffs claimed that education was a fundamental right because it was essential
to the proper use of First Amendment freedoms and the right to vote. Id. at 35-36. The
plaintiffs argued that these rights were worthless if one could not utilize them intelli-
gently. Id. The Court agreed that the Constitution guarantees a person's right to speak
and vote; however, the Constitution does not guarantee the means to "effective speech
or the most informed electoral choice." Id. at 36.
In his dissent, Justice Marshall agreed with the plaintiffs' argument. Id. at 112-13
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
318 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 42:311
The Court ascertained that education is not explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed under the Federal Constitution.42 Because neither a funda-
mental right nor a "suspect class" existed, the majority found the
Texas system valid under the "rational basis test"43 and held that the
system rationally advanced a legitimate state interest.44
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall stressed the importance of education in today's
society:
Education serves the essential function of instilling in our young an understanding
of and appreciation for the principles and operation of our governmental processes.
Education may instill the interest and provide the tools necessary for political dis-
course and debate. Indeed, it has frequently been suggested that education is the
dominant factor affecting political consciousness and participation.
Id. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42. 411 U.S. at 35.
43. Id. at 40-55. The Supreme Court has developed three tests under its equal pro-
tection analysis: (1) the rational basis test; (2) strict scrutiny; and (3) an intermediate
standard often referred to as "heightened scrutiny."
Under the rational basis test, a state action is valid so long as it is reasonably related
to a legitimate state purpose. See generally New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (upholding a state law unless the classification bears no
rational relationship to state's objective).
Under strict scrutiny analysis, the Court will carefully examine a statute if it creates a
classification that is suspect or impacts a fundamental right. If either is satisfied, the
state must show a "compelling state interest" for the statute and the statute must be a
means that is necessary to achieve the purpose. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249
(Cal. 1971). See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243 (1976) (finding that
a rule which renders a statute that is neutral on its face unconstitutional merely because
it has a racially disproportionate impact is too burdensome and far reaching); Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (stating that "[a]ll legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect").
The Supreme Court has proffered a third level of review referred to as "heightened"
or "intermediate" scrutiny. The courts apply intermediate scrutiny when a statute af-
fects a "sensitive" classification not yet bordering on "suspect." Hornbeck v. Somerset
County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 781-82 (Md. 1983). Courts may also apply this
standard where a statute imposes upon important personal rights or vital benefits. Id.
In order to survive this scrutiny, the statute "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly situated and circumstanced will be
treated alike." Id. See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 204 (1976) (finding
that an Oklahoma gender-based statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment because
the classification did not serve important governmental objectives and was not substan-
tially related to its stated objectives).
44. 411 U.S. at 55. The Court found that Texas' financing plan was the result of
qualified studies and thoughtful planning. Id. Many educators believed this plan was
an "enlightened approach" to the educational financing problem in today's society. Id.
Texas is constantly attempting to amend its plan in order to reduce wide disparities. Id.
The Court recognized that its role was not to place itself in the position of educators
and legislators who have already wrestled with the problem and possible solutions. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol42/iss1/19
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Although many commentators viewed Rodriguez as a setback, its
result did not deter school reformists. Shortly after the Rodriguez
decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court supplied school finance re-
formists with a new plan of attack.45 The decision in Robinson v. Ca-
hill4 6 transferred the battlefield for school finance reform from the
Federal Constitution to state constitutions.47 Robinson addressed two
separate issues to determine whether the state's financing program was
unconstitutional.
First, the court determined whether both the students and local tax-
payers were denied equal protection under the New Jersey Constitu-
tion.48 Instead of following the Rodriquez "fundamental right" test in
its equal protection analysis, 49 the court applied its own standards of
45. States have always invoked stricter protections of individual rights through state
constitutions than courts have granted under the Federal Constitution. See supra notes
71-72 and accompanying text for cases following this principle. The New Jersey
Supreme Court has been noted for its aggressiveness, in light of the United States
Supreme Court's strict interpretation of the Federal Constitution. Professor Laurence
H. Tribe of Harvard University Law School stated that
[t]he New Jersey court has most consistently advanced the idea ... that state
courts should take their Constitutions seriously and not regard them as pale
shadows of the Federal Constitution .... [t]he court has been in the forefront of a
move to take up the slack in so far as the Federal Court has flagged and wavered in
its commitment to human rights.
Joseph F. Sullivan, New Jersey Court Seen as Leader on Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
1990, at Bl. The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d
359 (N.J. 1990), provided further evidence of the court's aggressiveness. See infra notes
163-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Abbott decision. Despite New
Jersey spending the second highest amount on education of any state, the Abbott court
found that the state failed to provide a thorough and efficient education. Abbott, 575
A.2d at 412.
46. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
47. Id. at 282. The New Jersey Supreme Court prepared the Robinson opinion
before the United States Supreme Court handed down the Rodriguez decision. Id. at
279. In its preparation, the court addressed both the federal and state equal protection
issues. Id. at 282. Following the Rodriguez decision, the court accepted the United
States Supreme Court's position with respect to the federal issue. Id. The court did
not, however, apply the federal test of fundamentality to its state equal protection analy-
sis. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the federal fundamental right test
inadequate, stating that:
No one has successfully defined the term for this purpose. Even the proposition
discussed in Rodriguez, that a right is "fundamental" if it is explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed in the constitution, is immediately vulnerable, for the right to acquire
and hold property is guaranteed in the federal and state constitutions, and surely
that right is not a likely candidate for such preferred treatment.
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
320 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 42:311
equal protection analysis to the state constitution. ° In assessing the
applicable level of scrutiny, the Robinson court determined that classi-
fication according to students' wealth did not constitute a suspect
class.5 ' The court reasoned that the state legislature does not condition
the ability to attend school upon any minimum income level.52 The
court recognized two factors which determine each district's fund: the
size of the tax base; and the judgment of local authorities. 53
Next, the Robinson court addressed whether education qualified as a
fundamental right under the New Jersey Constitution. 4 While the
court stressed the importance of education, the court declined to ele-
vate it above any other essential government service. 55 The court rea-
soned that a state's obligation to provide a service does not
automatically render it fundamental.56 The court found that local rev-
Id.
50. Id. at 283. The court reluctantly applied an equal protection analysis. Id. The
court believed that the equal protection clause is unworkable when dealing with human
needs and attempting to characterize their importance. Id.
51. 303 A.2d at 283.
52. Id. at 283.
53. Id. The court hesitated to consider this a classification according to wealth
because all public services varied in a similar manner. Courts have always assumed that
"'taxes in different taxing districts in the State need not be uniform."' Id. (quoting I
COOLEY, TAXATION § 313, at 649 (Nichols, 4th ed. 1924)).
54. Id. at 283-84.
55. Id. at 284. The court quoted Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) as
affirming the importance of education in today's society. Id. See supra notes 39-44 and
accompanying text for discussion of the Supreme Court's emphasis on education. The
Robinson court stated that it was significant that the Supreme Court never cited Brown
in a decision involving a "fundamental right" claim. Id. The Robinson court conceded
that education is vital to society, but found that it would be difficult "to find an objective
basis to say the equal protection clause selects education and demands inflexible state-
wide uniformity in expenditure." Id.
56. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 285. The plaintiffs argued that if a state chose to provide
a service, that service became a fundamental right. Id. The state education article of
the New Jersey Constitution provided that the state "shall provide for.., free public
schools .... N.J. CONsT. art. VIII, § 4, 1. Plaintiffs alleged that this created an
obligation for the state to provide "uniform dollar input." Id.
The court rejected the argument that funding should not be left to the local school
districts on the ground that education is indistinguishable from other locally provided
services. Id. at 285-86. The court also found it irrelevant that the state constitution
mandates education. Id. Other state mandated services, such as the judicial system,
relied on local property values to provide revenue, and court systems were not financed
equally throughout the state. Id. at 286. The court believed that education was just




enues fund a multitude of state government services and that these
services frequently are not spread equally throughout the state.57
The Robinson court further articulated that even if wealth was a sus-
pect class or education was a fundamental right, the United States
Supreme Court has never held that a state's interest in the institution of
local government is not a "compelling state interest."5" The court be-
lieved that the public is best served by allowing localities to voice their
views regarding the amount of services provided. 9 In nearly all states,
local contributions provide a significant percentage of the education
budget. 6° Thus, the court reasoned that the state has a compelling in-
terest in using local governments in the manner which it deems best.6 1
The second argument proffered in Robinson focused on the state ed-
ucation article of New Jersey's Constitution.62 Article VIII of the New
Jersey Constitution states that "the legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free
public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State be-
tween the ages of five and eighteen years." 3 This provision raised the
question whether the state funding plan provided a "thorough and effi-
cient" education despite the existence of disparities in funding among
districts."4
The court interpreted "thorough and efficient" as guaranteeing chil-
dren an equal opportunity to fulfill their role as citizens and compete in
the labor market.65 The court attempted to measure the state's compli-
ance with this mandate by looking at the level of "dollar input.' 66 The
Robinson court found that monetary expenditures have a significant
57. Id.
58. Id. at 286.
59. Id.
60. On average in the United States, local funding accounts for 45% of the revenue
for public schools, the state provides 50%, and the federal government 5%. TH
STRUCTURE OF STATE AID, supra note 3, at 1. See also Kosterlitz, supra note 2, at
1769.
61. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 286.
62. Id. at 287.
63. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 1.
64. 303 A.2d at 295.
65. Id.
66. Id. The court used dollar input as the criterion in evaluating whether New
Jersey's educational system was "thorough and efficient" because of its obvious rele-
vance and the absence of any other measure. Id.
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impact on the quality of educational opportunities.67 Therefore, the
court surmised that the present financing system in New Jersey, with
its wide disparity in funding, did not satisfy the state education arti-
cle.68 The court's holding compelled the state to insure a "thorough
and efficient" education to all children within the state.69
Although Rodriguez rendered the federal equal protection argument
as moot, Robinson shifted the focus to state constitutions and state
courts.7° State courts have jurisdiction to interpret state constitutional
67. Id. at 277. Although the court recognized that equal distribution of funds will
not necessarily guarantee equal educational results, the court did find that the level of
spending plays an important role in the quality of an education. Id.
68. Id. at 297.
69. 303 A.2d at 298. The steps toward legislative reform in New Jersey traveled a
long and arduous path. Not until 1975 did the legislature enact a new funding plan.
This new legislative action was surrounded by six other Robinson v. Cahill decisions.
See Robinson v. Cahill (II), 306 A.2d 65, 66 (N.J. 1973) (giving the New Jersey legisla-
ture a December 31, 1974 deadline to enact new legislation in accordance with the views
of Robinson 1), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill (III), 335 A.2d 6
(N.J. 1975) (reacting to the legislature's failure to meet the December 31, 1974 deadline,
but refusing to order any changes in statutory funding for the 1975-76 school year);
Robinson v. Cahill (IV), 351 A.2d 713, 722 (N.J. 1975) (ordering various state aid to be
distributed according to the equalization aid formula of the 1970 Act for the 1976-77
school year), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill (V), 355 A.2d 129
(1976) (finding the new plan enacted by the legislature constitutional on its face);
Robinson v. Cahill (VI), 358 A.2d 457, 459 (N.J. 1976) (enjoining any public school
from opening until the funding was in compliance with the state education clause);
Robinson v. Cahill (VII), 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976) (removing the injunction in re-
sponse to the full funding provided by the legislature).
70. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 13, at 225-26. In fact, courts have inter-
preted Rodriguez as leaving school finance reform to the states themselves. The follow-
ing are examples of statements by the Supreme Court in Rodriquez that have affected
state courts in their analysis of state financing plans:
We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the way in which Texas has
chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues. We are asked to con-
demn the state's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax
local property to supply revenue for local interests. In so doing, appellees would
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state
legislatures.
San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
[W]e continue to acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the exper-
tise and familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise deci-
sions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues.
411 U.S. at 41.
The Rodriquez Court expressed concern for the relationship between national and
state power under the federal system:
[I]t would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol42/iss1/19
SCHOOL FINANCING
provisions.71 Moreover, when analyzing provisions of their own con-
stitutions, state courts are not obligated to follow United States
Supreme Court interpretations of the federal Constitution.72 Thus, a
state court is not bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez
when determining whether education is a state constitutional right en-
titled to equal protection guarantees.
Following Robinson, a deluge of cases hit state courts, arguing that
their state financing plans were unconstitutional.7 3 Litigants used both
federal system than the one now before us, in which we are urged to abrogate
systems of financing public education presently in existence in virtually every state.
411 U.S. at 44.
71. See Serrano v. Priest (II), 557 P.2d 929, 950 (Cal. 1976) (declaring that a state
supreme court is subject only to the requirement that its interpretations do not interfere
with any rights or guarantees under the Constitution), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977);
Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 332 (Wyo. 1980)
(noting that a state provision can enlarge an individual's rights granted under the Fed-
eral Constitution), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
72. Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 950. State courts can look to United States Supreme
Court decisions defining fundamental rights under the Federal Constitution as persua-
sive authority. Id. They are not, however, required to follow them unless they provide
more individual protection than state law. Id. See also Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of
Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1016 n.11 (Colo. 1982) (stating that state courts are "free to
consider the merits of a constitutional challenge under their own constitutional provi-
sions ... independently of United States Supreme Court opinions, even when the State
and Federal Constitutions are similarly or identically phrased").
73. Between 1973 and 1989, numerous cases addressing educational funding in light
of state constitutions were decided in state courts. See, eg., Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist.
No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983) (deeming Arkansas' state financing plan uncon-
stitutional, reasoning that the disbursement of state funds to school districts according
to local tax bases denies equal educational opportunities to students); Serrano v. Priest
(II), 557 P.2d 929, 952-53 (Cal. 1976) (finding the plan unconstitutional "because it
establishes and perpetuates a classification based upon district wealth which affects the
fundamental interest of education"); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d
1005, 1022-25 (Colo. 1982) (holding that the state financing plan was constitutional
under the rational basis standard of review and that the state plan satisfied the state
education article); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977) (holding that the
state financing plan "cannot pass the test of 'strict judicial scrutiny' "); McDaniel v.
Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 168 (Ga. 1981) (holding that the state financing plan bears
"some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes and is therefore not violative of
state equal protection"); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758,
780, 789 (Md. 1983) (upholding the school financing plan on the grounds that it does
not violate state equal protection guarantees and that the state education article does
not require equality of expenditures among school districts); Board of Educ., Levittown
Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 370 (N.Y. 1982) (upholding state
financing plan under the state equal protection clause and the state education article);
Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ, 357 S.E.2d 432, 436 (N.C. App. 1987) (con-
cluding that the state education article stating that "equal opportunities shall be pro-
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arguments enunciated by the New Jersey Supreme Court.74 In Robin-
son, the plaintiffs argued that disparities in educational funding consti-
tuted a violation of the state's equal protection guarantees and the
state's education article.75 Although school reformists who followed
this reasoning found some success in the era between Robinson and
1989, their victories were few.76 The courts that did strike down the
financing plans relied primarily on the state's equal protection
guarantees.7 7
vided for all students" only guarantees state citizens equal access to participate in the
school system and does not guarantee a substantially equal education to all children);
Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 822, 825 (Ohio 1979) (upholding the state
financing plan in light of both the state equal protection guarantees and the state educa-
tion article), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v.
State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1149 (Okla. 1987) (holding that equal expenditures per pupil are
not guaranteed by the state education article); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 148 (Or.
1976) (upholding funding plan in light of both state equal protection guarantees and the
state education article); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360, 367 (Pa. 1979) (holding that
the state did not violate its duty to provide a "thorough and efficient" education); Rich-
land County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470, 472 (S.C. App. 1988) (holding the state fi-
nancing plan constitutional under both the state education article and equal protection
guarantees); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 104 (Wash. 1978) (relying
exclusively on the state education article to strike down the state's financing plan);
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (holding that the state financing
plan is subject to both the equal protection guarantee and the education article of the
West Virginia Constitution and that the plan could not survive equal protection analysis
unless the state could justify the unequal classification); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d
568, 578-80 (Wis. 1989) (upholding state financing system, stating that the plan satisfied
the state education article and did not violate equal protection guarantees under the
rational basis standard); Washakie County Sch. Dist. Number One v. Herschler, 606
P.2d 310, 334-35 (Wyo. 1980) (declaring Wyoming's educational financing plan uncon-
stitutional because it failed to satisfy the state's equal protection guarantee). For a
breakdown of the history of the school finance reform litigation, see generally Thro, The
Third Wave, supra note 13 (classifying the case law into three separate time periods).
74. See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state equal
protection clause argument. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the argument concerning the state education article.
75. See supra notes 48-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Robinson
court's reasoning.
76. Between 1973 and 1988, only seven litigants, including the plaintiffs in Robin-
son, were successful on their claims to strike down school financing plans. See, e.g.,
Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest (II),
557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Robinson v.
Cahill (I), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71
(Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch.
Dist. Number One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
77. See supra note 76 for cases that struck down their state's financing plans. The
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State equal protection clauses vary from state to state.7" As a result,
state courts' analyses and interpretations of their equal protection pro-
visions vary according to each state as well. 9 Courts typically react in
one of three ways when faced with an equal protection argument.80
First, courts simply apply the federal standard of equal protection"
and determine whether a fundamental right or a suspect class exists
under the Federal Constitution; if so, then the court applies a strict
scrutiny analysis.8 2
Second, courts may adopt a federal analysis, but apply their own
independent state standards.8 3 For example, in the second Serrano v.
Priest 8 4 decision, the court adopted the Rodriquez court's test for de-
termining a fundamental right, but applied it to the California Consti-
tution." The Serrano II court recognized that equal protection
analysis under a state constitution may differ from the federal stan-
dard. 6 The Serrano 11 court reasoned that a state fundamental right
existed if explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the state constitution"7
only states that did not utilize equal protection analyses and relied solely on their state
education article were New Jersey and Washington.
78. Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX.
L. REv. 1195, 1196 (1985). Most state constitutions do not have explicit equal protec-
tion clauses. Id. For examples of state constitutions that do contain equal protection
clauses, see GA. CONsT. art. I, § 1, para. II; ILL. CONsT. art. I, § 2; OHIO CONsT. art. I,
§ 2. For a comparison between federal and state equality provisions, see generally Wil-
liams, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1195 (1985).
79. Id. at 1196-97.
80. See Williams, supra note 78, at 1219; Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 13, at
230 n.50.
81. Williams, supra note 78, at 1219. See supra notes 28-44 and accompanying text
for a discussion of federal equal protection analysis.
82. Williams, supra note 78, at 1219. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text
for a discussion of strict scrutiny.
83. Williams, supra note 78, at 1219. See also Thro, The Third Wave, supra note
13, at 230 n.50.
84. 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
85. Id. at 949-50. For a discussion of the Rodriguez fundamental right test, see
supra note 39 and accompanying text.
86. Serrano 11, 557 P.2d at 950. The Serrano II court stated that:
[O]ur state equal protection provisions, while "substantially the equivalent of" the
guarantees contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, are possessed of an independent vitality which, in a given case, may demand
an analysis different from that which would obtain if only the federal standard
were applicable.
Id.
87. Id. at 949-50. The Serrano II court interpreted the California Constitution and
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whereas Rodriquez required the Federal Constitution to guarantee that
right."8 Serrano II held that education is a state fundamental right
subject to strict scrutiny.8 9
Finally, courts may reject the federal analysis entirely and adopt
their own standard.' In Robinson, the court completely abandoned
the federal fundamental right test.91 In its place, the Robinson court
invoked a balancing test weighing the nature of the restriction against
the apparent public justification to determine if the state action was
arbitrary.92 The court refused to subject education to an equal protec-
tion analysis because of its impracticality when applied to the broad
spectrum of important human needs.93 The Robinson court eventually
struck down New Jersey's financing plan solely on the ground that the
financing plan did not comply with the state education article.94
Prior to 1989, only one other court relied exclusively on its state
education article. In Seattle School District No. 1 of King County v.
State,95 the Washington Supreme Court relied on Article IX, section 1
of the Washington Constitution which states: "it is the paramount
duty of the state to make ample provisions for the education of all
specifically followed two provisions as equivalent to the federal equal protection clause:
CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 16: (a) "... . all laws of a general nature have uniform opera-
tion;" CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 7(b): "No special privileges or immunities shall ever be
granted which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the legislature, nor shall any
citizen or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same
terms, shall not be granted to all citizens."
88. See supra note 39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Rodriguez re-
quirements of a fundamental right.
89. Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 951. The court interpreted the equality provision in the
California Constitution as "substantially the equivalent" to the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 950. However, the court rejected the Supreme
Court's application of strict scrutiny to state public school financing in light of the Cali-
fornia Constitution. Id. at 951. Instead, the court applied judicial scrutiny more rigor-
ously and critically. Id.
90. Williams, supra note 78, at 1220-21. See also Thro, The Third Wave, supra note
13, at 230 n.50.
91. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 13, at 230 n.50. See supra notes 48-53 and
accompanying text for an analysis of Robinson.
92. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 282, 273 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976
(1973). The court noted that the State may be required to justify the need for the re-
striction. Id.
93. Id. at 283.
94. Id. at 295. See supra notes 62-69 for a discussion of the state education article.
95. 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
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children residing within its borders."9 6 The Seattle School District
court interpreted "paramount" as a clear indication of the state's con-
stitutionally imposed "duty" to provide children with an ample oppor-
tunity for an education.97 The court inferred from this language that
education is a top state priority.9 8 The court held that the state must
provide the minimum level of education that will allow children to
compete in the "political system, in the labor market, or in the market
place of ideas."9 9
II. RECENT DECISIONS UTILIZING THE NEW APPROACH
Although no state court overturned a state educational financing
96. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. See Thro, To Render Them Safe, supra note 18, at
1661-70. The author, William Thro, placed the varying state education provisions into
four categories:
Category I: Minimal Education Standards: these typically do not mention any stan-
dard of quality of public education. Thro listed Oklahoma's education clause as an
example. Id. at 1662 n.107. See OKLA. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1 which states that "[t]he
Legislature shall establish and maintain a system of free public schools wherein all the
children of the State may be educated."
Category II: Minimum Standards of Quality (i.e. "thorough and efficient"): Thro
listed several examples of Category II provisions. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1;
COLO. CONST. art IX, § 2; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONsr. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO
CONST. art. IX, § I; Ky. CONST. § 183; MD. CONsr. art. VIII, § 1; MINN. CONST. art.
XIII, § 1; Mor. CON ST. art. X, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.D. CONsT. art.
VIII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 3; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III,
§ 14; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; VA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1;
W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3. Thro, To Render Them Safe,
supra note 18, at 1663 n.l10.
Category III: Thro found that these provisions were more promising for educational
reformers because they contained stronger and more specific language than Categories I
and II. Thro, To Render Them Safe, supra note 18, at 1666-67. Thro cited South Da-
kota's provision as an example of this type. Id. at 1666 n. 119. S.D. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1 states, in part, that "it shall be the duty of the Legislature... to adopt all suitable
means to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education."
Category IV: Thro found that these provisions imposed the largest obligation on
legislatures. These clauses typically label education as "primary" or "paramount." Id.
at 1668. A good example is the preamble of Washington's Constitution. Id. at 1668
n. 127. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 which provides that education of all children is "the
paramount duty of the state ...." See also Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for
Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX L. REV. 777, 815-16
(1985), and Erica B. Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual
Education, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 52, 66-70 (1974) (similarly categorizing state
education into four areas).
97. Seattle School District, 585 P.2d at 91.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 94-95.
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plan between 1983 and 1989, interest in education reform did not
wane."°° Responding to unfavorable statistics regarding American ed-
ucation, states ignored the financing issue and concentrated on other
educational reforms such as increased compensation for teachers and
the decentralization of school management.1 ' In 1989, school financ-
ing again became a prominent issue as a result of courts' new approach
declaring state plans unconstitutional.'0 2
A. Helena Elementary School District One v. State
The Montana Supreme Court declared the State's educational fund-
ing system unconstitutional in Helena Elementary School District One
v. State." 3 The court relied solely on the state education article and
expressly rejected applying any equal protection analysis."°
In Helena, several school districts alleged that the public school
funding plan violated Montana's state education article.'0 5 Article X,
section 1 of the Montana Constitution provides, in part, that
"[e]quality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of
the state."'0 6 The plaintiffs alleged that spending disparities, ranging
as high as eight-to-one, created unequal educational opportunities for
Montana citizens.10 7
Upon reviewing the lower court's decision, the Montana Supreme
Court first noted that the district court declared education as a funda-
100. THE STRUCTURE OF STATE AID, supra note 3, at vii.
101. Id.
102. Id. at viii.
103. 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
104. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text discussing the court's rationale
behind its holding.
105. 769 P.2d at 685.
106. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1 provides in full:
(1) It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education which will
develop the full educational potential of each person. Equality of educational op-
portunity is guaranteed to each person of the state.
(2) The state recognizes the distinct unique cultural heritage of the American
Indians and is committed in its educational goals to the preservation of their cul-
tural integrity.
(3) The legislature shall provide a basic system of free quality public elementary
and secondary schools. The legislature may provide such other educational institu-
tions, public libraries, and educational programs as it deems desirable. It shall
fund and distribute in an equitable manner to the school districts the state's share
of the cost of the basic elementary and secondary school system.
107. 769 P.2d at 686.
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mental right under the Montana Constitution."' 8 In addition, the dis-
trict court found categorical differences between wealthy and poor
school districts." 9 The district court opined that the availability of
funds clearly affected the extent and quality of educational opportuni-
ties.110 Not only were richer districts able to offer a greater range of
curricula, they had better textbooks and facilities.1 "1 Based on these
disparities, the district court found the state plan inadequate because it
failed to even pass the less rigid "rational basis test" under an equal
protection analysis." 2
On appeal, the State proffered three arguments attacking the district
court decision. First, the State claimed that its current system satisfied
the constitutional requirements1 13 because the constitution limited the
legislature's duty to guarantee equal education.11 The court rejected
this argument, relying instead on the plain meaning of the constitu-
tion. 1 5 The court concluded that the equality of educational opportu-
nity guarantee applies to each person and binds the state, local, and
school district levels of government." 6
Second, the State argued that the quality of education is a better
indicator of educational equality than the level of spending.1 17 The
court rejected this argument on the ground that the State failed to sup-
108. Id. at 688.
109. Id. at 687. The Court relied on the findings of "study team." The Montana
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding that spending differences between
the rich and poor districts resulted in unequal education. Id. at 686. The court rea-
soned that wealthier school districts were able to generate a greater amount of revenue
with which to provide better curricula and facilities. Id. at 687-88. The richer districts
also had greater flexibility in budgeting to enable them to better address current educa-
tional needs. Id. at 687.
110. Id. at 688.
111. 769 P.2d at 687-88.
112. Id. at 688.
113. Id. at 689. The State argued that Art. X, § 1, subsection (1) of the Montana
Constitution which states that: "[e]quality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to
each person" is merely an aspirational goal. Id. The court rejected this argument and
relied on the plain meaning of the constitution. Id. The court stated that the word
"goal," although used in the first sentence of subsection (1), was not used in the second
sentence. Id. Instead, the framers used the word "guaranteed." Id. Thus, the court
reasoned that each person in the state is "guaranteed" an equal opportunity for an
education. Id.
114. Id.
115. 769 P.2d at 689.
116. Id. at 690.
117. Id.
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port its "output theory" with sound evidence." 8 Instead, the Montana
Supreme Court found that spending differences among school districts
had a direct impact on the level of a student's educational
opportunity."19
Third, the State interpreted the Montana Constitution's grant of
control to the local school districts as express approval of the spending
disparities among districts. 2 ' Article X, section 8 states: "[t]he super-
vision and control of schools in each school district shall be vested in a
board of trustees to be elected as provided by law."'' Although super-
vision is granted locally, the court declared that funding is still a func-
tion of the State.122 The court concluded that funding may be
delegated to localities, but the State is ultimately responsible for fund-
ing equality. 123
The Helena court neither determined whether education is a funda-
mental right nor considered the equal protection issue. 124 Basing its
decision solely on the education article of the Montana Constitution,
the court found the current funding plan inadequate. 125 According to
the Montana Supreme Court, the plan's spending disparities denied
each student an equal opportunity for an education. 126
B. Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.
In Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.,'127 the Kentucky
118. Id. The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the district court which found
insufficient evidence that equality can be measured by analyzing the success of students
from different school districts. Id.
119. 769 P.2d at 686-88. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
findings that wealthier school districts did not share the educational deficiencies exper-
ienced at the poorer schools. Id. For example, the wealthier districts had more com-
puters and well-equipped labs which the court reasoned directly related to "hands on"
learning. Id. at 687-88.
120. Id. at 690.
121. MONT. CONsT. art. X, § 8.
122. 769 P.2d at 690.
123. Id. The court further noted that the present inequality of funding may even
restrict local control. Id. Obviously, if a district has minimal resources, its options are
also limited. Id.
124. Id. at 691. The court reasoned that "[b]ecause we have concluded that the
school funding system is unconstitutional under Art. X, Sec. 1, MONT. CONST., we do
not find it necessary to consider the equal protection issue." Id.
125. Id. at 690.
126. 769 P.2d at 690.
127. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
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Supreme Court struck down the State's financing program because it
failed to provide each child with "an equal opportunity to have an ade-
quate education." 128 The court determined that education was a fun-
damental right under the Kentucky Constitution, 129 but it did not
address the equal protection issue. Instead, the court relied on the
State education article mandating that the State "provide an efficient
system of schools throughout the State."13
The court focused its attention solely on whether the Kentucky Leg-
islature had established an efficient school system.' 31 In addressing
this issue, the court primarily concentrated on determining the defini-
tion of "efficient." '32 The court concluded that an "efficient" system
must provide each child with an equal opportunity to an education
regardless of the child's place of residence or economic circum-
stances.' 3 3 The court held that the present Kentucky system failed to
128. Id. at 212. In Rose, the plaintiffs brought an action against the State of Ken-
tucky alleging that the school financing system was inadequate because it excessively
relied on local resources. Id. at 190. The trial court found that this emphasis resulted
in inequitable disparities throughout the state. Id. at 197. Specifically, the court found
that achievement scores were lower in poorer districts than in wealthier districts and
that the curricula varied greatly between the richer and poorer districts. Id. For exam-
ple, poorer districts did not have the strength of the affluent in areas such as foreign
language, science, mathematics, and the arts. Id. Further, student-teacher ratios were
lower in wealthier districts. Id.
In striking down the plan, the trial court deemed education a fundamental right. Id.
at 192. The trial court further found that the plan was discriminatory because the level
of funding was based on a student's place of residence. Id. The trial court held that this
constituted a suspect class based on wealth. Id.
129. Id. at 206. In determining the fundamentality of education, the court reasoned
that the framers of the Kentucky Constitution "emphasized that education is essential
to the welfare of the citizens of the Commonwealth." Id. The court relied on the
constitutional debates over § 183 of the Kentucky Constitution. Id. at 205-06. Section
183 provides that: "[t]he General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide
for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State." KY. CONST. § 183.
130. 790 S.W.2d at 214. See supra note 129 citing Ky. CoNsT. § 183 in full.
131. 790 S.W.2d at 213.
132. Id. at 211-13.
133. Id. at 212. The court articulated nine minimal, essential characteristics which
schools must meet in order to have an "efficient" system. They are as follows:
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meet this standard.134 The Rose court, however, did not limit its ac-
tion to Kentucky's financing program, but overturned the entire public
education system within Kentucky.13
C. Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby
In Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby,136 the Texas
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the State's school fi-
nancing program.1 3 7  The plaintiffs argued that the system was
wrought with huge inequities.131 In Texas, the State provides about
forty-two percent of education costs, whereas individual school dis-
tricts are responsible for raising over fifty percent through local prop-
erty taxes. 139  Incredibly, the average property wealth ranged from
(1) The establishment, maintenance and funding of common schools in Ken-
tucky is the sole responsibility of the General Assembly.
(2) Common schools shall be free to all.
(3) Common schools shall be available to all Kentucky children.
(4) Common schools shall be substantially uniform throughout the state.
(5) Common schools shall provide equal educational opportunities to all Ken-
tucky children, regardless of place of residence or economic circumstances.
(6) Common schools shall be monitored by the General Assembly to assure that
they are operated with no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, and with no
political influence.
(7) The premise for the existence of common schools is that all children in Ken-
tucky have a constitutional right to an adequate education.
(8) The General Assembly shall provide funding which is sufficient to provide
each child in Kentucky an adequate education.
(9) An adequate education is one which has as its goal the development of the
seven capacities recited previously.
Id. at 212-13.
134. Id. at 214.
135. 790 S.W.2d at 214. The court expressed disappointment at Kentucky's overall
effort to improve its educational system. Id. at 213. The system is "inadequate and well
below the national effort." Id. at 197. The court found that 35% of Kentucky's adult
population are drop-outs and only 68.2% of ninth graders graduate high school. Id.
The evidence showed that every district suffered, not just the poorer localities. Id.
In response to these findings, the court declared the entire statutory system unconsti-
tutional in the face of § 183 of the Kentucky Constitution. Id. at 215.
136. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
137. Id. The Texas financing system consists of state funding in a two-tiered struc-
ture known as the "Foundation School Program." Id. at 392. See infra note 201 for a
description of this plan.
138. Id. at 392-93.
139. Id. This is not an unusual structure for states. In the following 23 states,
localities are responsible for raising more revenue than the state itself: Colorado, Con-
necticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
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$14,000,000 per student in one district to $20,000 per student in an-
other. 1" Because of these extreme differences, poorer districts needed
to tax at a higher rate than the affluent districts to accumulate equal
funding.14 1
Sixty-eight school districts and others subject to these inequities
brought this suit, arguing that the Texas financing plan was unconstitu-
tional. 142 The trial court struck down the plan, finding that education
was a fundamental right; that wealth was a "suspect classification;"
and that the system was "inefficient" under Article VII, section 1 of the
Texas Constitution.1 43 The State court of appeals reversed the district
court on the ground that education was not a fundamental right. 1" In
addition, the appellate court determined that the definition of "effi-
cient" under Article VII was a political question and not subject to
gan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming. The Structure of State Aid, supra note 3, at 12. For a breakdown of the spending
among states, localities, and the federal government, see supra note 60.
140. 777 S.W.2d at 392. The 300,000 students of the poorest districts have 3% of
the state's property wealth whereas the 300,000 students of the richest districts have
over 25% of the wealth. Id.
141. Id. at 393. Local property tax rates in the state of Texas fell between nine
cents and $1.55 per $100 valuation in 1985-86. Id. The one hundred richest districts
had an average tax of S.47 while spending $7,233 per student. Id. The one hundred
poorer districts, however, had an average tax rate of $.745 and spent only $2,978 per
child. Id.
142. Id. at 391-92. Individual parents and children were also plaintiffs in the ac-
tion. Id. at 392.
143. Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988), rev'd, 771 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). Art. VII, § 1 of the Texas Constitution pro-
vides: "A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liber-
ties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature of the state to establish
and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of
public free schools." TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
144. 761 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
The appellate court adopted the federal equal protection analysis under Rodriguez and
found that although the Texas Constitution mentions "education," it does not rise to
the level of a fundamental right. Id. at 862-63. The appellate court reasoned that there
is a distinction between the Federal Constitution and the Texas Constitution. Id. at
862-63. Through prior decisions the Texas Supreme Court has adopted a narrow inter-
pretation of a fundamental right, stating that "'[flundamental rights have their genesis
in the express and implied protections of personal liability recognized in federal and
state constitutions."' Id. at 863 (quoting Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d
556, 560 (Tex. 1985)). The appellate court concentrated on the word "liberty" and
determined that a right to education does not give rise to any interference with a per-
son's liberty. Id.
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judicial review. 145
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court did not address the issue of
equal protection, limiting its review solely to a determination of the
state education article's intent.1 46 The court rejected the appellate
court's deference to the legislature, stating that the language of article
VII, section 1 imposes an affirmative duty on the legislature to provide
free education to the public. 147 The Texas Supreme Court ruled that it
could review legislative enactments in order to ensure that the legisla-
ture complied with its constitutional mandate. 14 ' The court found that
the legislature must provide an "efficient" system for the "essential"
purpose of a "general diffusion of knowledge."' 49
The court decided the case based on its interpretation of the word
"efficient" within Article VII. The State argued that the framers
merely intended "efficient" to connote a simple and inexpensive sys-
tem.150 The court addressed this argument by looking to the intent of
Article VII and interpreting "efficient" to mean "effective or produc-
tive of results."' 5' The court reasoned that the framers of the constitu-
tion did not anticipate the gross disparities that exist in today's
system.' 52 The court noted that although the original purpose of an
"efficient system" was to effectuate a "general diffusion of knowledge,"
the current system failed to generally diffuse, and instead advanced a
limited and unbalanced education. 153
The Edgewood court held that Texas' present financing system failed
to meet the level of efficiency required by the state constitution. 154 The
145. Id. at 867. The court reasoned that the provision does not offer the courts any
indication of the proper interpretation of "efficient." Id. The court therefore decided
that this question is best left for the legislature to determine. Id.
146. 777 S.W.2d at 398.
147. Id. at 394.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 777 S.W.2d at 394. The State based its argument on the notion that under the
1875 Constitutional Convention, delegates intentionally used the word "efficient" to
prevent the continuance of a highly centralized school system. Id. Prior to 1875, the
State used an unpopular system exercising complete control over the children and the
state argued that the use of "efficient" was meant to diffuse this type of system. Id.
151. Id. at 395.
152. Id. Delegates at the 1875 Convention stressed the importance of education for
all citizens, rich and poor. Id.
153. Id. at 396.
154. 777 S.W.2d at 397. The court expressly found that the plan failed to provide
both adequate financing and education. Id.
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court further enumerated that a direct and close correlation between a
district's taxing system and the available educational resources must
exist. 55 In other words, children who live in either poor districts or in
rich districts are entitled to a substantially equal opportunity to educa-
tional funds.156
III. LEGISLATIVE ACTION AND STATE COURTS' REACTION
A. Abbott v. Burke
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Abbott v. Burke 157 dis-
tinguishes itself as the first court to review a state financing plan
amended in response to a judicial mandate.158 Following Robinson v.
Cahill (IV),1"9 the New Jersey Legislature enacted a new funding
mechanism designed to satisfy the "thorough and efficient" provi-
sion. 1'6 The court in Robinson v. Cahill (V) 161 subsequently recog-
nized that although the act was constitutional on its face, it was
possible that some districts would be unable to provide a thorough and
efficient education.1 62 The Abbott court now faced the issue of whether
the legislative action was constitutional when applied to poorer
districts. 163
An important shift in emphasis occurred during the evolution of
New Jersey case law.I 6M In Robinson v. Cahill (1),165 the court focused
on the amount of funds necessary to provide each student with a mini-
mum educational opportunity. 166 The focus of Robinson (V) centered
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
158. Id. at 363.
159. 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
160. 575 A.2d at 369. In addition to administrative measures, the legislature also
provided a new financing plan to maintain a "thorough and efficient" education. Id.
The new plan placed responsibility on the state to maintain a thorough and efficient
level of education in each district. Id. Despite this requirement, the Abbott court be-
lieved that the plan still allowed disparity among the rich and poor districts. Id. For a
summary of the evolution of the litigation involving New Jersey's school financing plan,
see supra note 69 and infra notes 164-69.
161. 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976).
162. Id. at 144.
163. 575 A.2d at 365-66.
164. Id. at 369. See supra note 69 for the progression of Robinson.
165. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
166. Id. at 276-77. The court in Robinson I concentrated not on the equality of
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not on the level of funding, but on the sufficiency of the funding to
support the goal of a "thorough and efficient" educational system.' 67
Funding quality was only important if it had an impact on the level of
substantive education within a district.168 In Abbott, the New Jersey
Supreme Court focused on the quality of the education received, not
the level of monetary input.169 The court declared that an educational
system is only "thorough and efficient" if poorer students receive the
same substantive education as the students in richer districts. 70
Although the Abbott court emphasized the quality of substantive ed-
ucation within a district, it also considered the level of monetary input
a significant factor. 7 ' The court found a direct causal relationship be-
tween the amount of money invested in education and its resulting
quality.' 72 Under the New Jersey system, local school districts relied
heavily on revenue from property taxes to fund their schools. 1 73 A
poorer district's low property values combined with "municipal over-
burden" severely limited that district's ability to raise an adequate
amount of money for education.' 74 Because this limitation hampered
education but on the quality of education. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 368. The New Jersey
Constitution required that each student be provided a minimum level of education. Id.
The court in Robinson I believed that if the lowest expenditure was producing a thor-
ough and efficient education, then the constitution was satisfied no matter how many
districts spent above the minimum amount. Id. The Robinson I court merely required
that the excess spending not dilute the ability of the state to provide a thorough and
efficient education to all districts. Id.
167. 575 A.2d at 370. The Abbott court interpreted the Robinson V decision as
rendering equal expenditure "per pupil relevant only if it impacts" on the quality of
education in a district. Id. If a district failed because of money, "the remedy was not to
change the statute but to implement it by forcing the district to spend more by supply-
ing further state funds." Id.
168. Id. at 370.
169. Id. at 372.
170. Id.
171. 575 A.2d at 374. The court stated that any evidence regarding the substance of
education is largely circumstantial and therefore is not enough to prevent consideration
of dollar input disparity. Id. Further, the court later stated that money is indeed one of
the many factors necessary to assess the quality of education. Id. at 406. The court
reasoned that money would not guarantee a "thorough and efficient" education, but it
was a starting point to insure that schools have an equal opportunity to provide a "thor-
ough and efficient" education. Id.
172. Id. at 387. The court found that "the poorer the district and the greater its
need, the less the money available, and the worse the education." Id.
173. Id. at 377-78.
174. Id. at 378. Municipal overburden occurs when the local costs of government
are so high that municipalities become reluctant to raise taxes. Id. Poorer districts are
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all hopes of educational quality in poorer districts, the court concluded
that these districts will never be able to provide a "thorough and effi-
cient" education for its students.1 75
In its analysis, the Abbott court assumed that children of poorer ar-
eas are as intellectually capable as their richer counterparts. 176 The
court reasoned that the educational discrepancies between the groups
merely resulted from their socioeconomic status. 17 7 Therefore, the
court concluded that a "thorough and efficient" education would close
this gap. 178 The court then defined a "thorough and efficient" educa-
tion as providing students with the ability to fully participate in all
societal functions.1 79 Applying this standard, the Abbott court held
that the present system precluded students from poorer districts from
entering the same market or the same society as their peers educated in
wealthier districts.180
Based on this conclusion, the court took an aggressive stance. The
court believed that the quality of education within the poorer districts
was so inadequate that it necessitated significant changes in the educa-
already taxed at a high rate in order to pay for police, firefighters, road maintenance,
and garbage collection. Id. The Abbott court found that social and economic pressures
on municipalities are so steep "that tax increases in any substantial amount are almost
unthinkable." Id. at 394.
175. 575 A.2d at 394. The court expressly found that "[t]he funding mechanism of
the Act will never achieve a thorough and efficient education because it relies so heavily
on a local property base already over-taxed to exhaustion." Id.
176. Id. at 385-86. This was an important premise of the court in deciding this
case. The court reasoned that the students in poorer districts could perform as well as
other students if given the proper education. Id. at 386. The court stated that the New
Jersey Constitution does not allow poor children to receive an inferior education on the
theory that the children could neither afford a better education nor benefit from one.
Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 395-97 (assessing the differences between courses and extracurricular
activities offered in rich and poor districts).
179. 575 A.2d at 397. The court stated that:
Thorough and efficient means more than teaching the skills needed to compete in
the labor market, as critically important as that may be. It means being able to
fulfill one's role as a citizen, a role that encompasses far more than merely register-
ing to vote. It means the ability to participate fully in society, in the life of one's
community, the ability to appreciate music, art, and literature, and the ability to
share all of that with friends.
Id.
180. Id. at 400.
19921
Washington University Open Scholarship
338 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 42:311
tional system. 1 ' The court reiterated that students from poorer urban
districts are constitutionally entitled to a "thorough and efficient" edu-
cation which will afford them the opportunity to properly function in
today's society." 2 To accomplish this, the totality of the poorer dis-
tricts' educational conferment must possess elements over and above
the regular education programs in the affluent suburban districts.'8 3
The court reasoned that a student in a poorer district is so disadvan-
taged that simply receiving a "regular education" will be insufficient to
overcome these disadvantages.18 4 The court asserted that even if poor
and wealthy districts receive an equal amount of funding, the poorer
districts will never overcome the socioeconomic disadvantages.185 In
support of this assertion, the court articulated that poorer urban dis-
tricts require more than a regular education in order to overcome their
inherent disabilities and receive a thorough and efficient education
under the Constitution.
1 8 6
Therefore, the court ordered the legislature to amend the act to
guarantee that the educational funding of poorer districts is "substan-
tially equal" to that of richer districts.'88 Although the Abbott court
allowed the legislature to devise any remedy it desired, the court di-
rected the legislature to adequately provide for the special needs of
poorer urban districts in light of their disadvantages.188 This remedy,
the court concluded, would assure a thorough and efficient education
181. Id. at 401. The court realized that substantive changes in the system were
necessary:
The nation has come to recognize the education of the urban poor as a most diffi-
cult and important problem. While opinions concerning the methods, approaches,
and techniques differ concerning their effectiveness, their advantages and disadvan-
tages, there is solid agreement on the basic proposition that conventional education
is totally inadequate to address the special problems of the urban poor. Something
quite different is needed, something that deals not only with reading, writing, and
arithmetic, but with the environment that shapes these students' lives and deter-
mines their educational needs.
Id.
182. Id. at 402-03.
183. 575 A.2d at 402.
184. Id. at 402-03.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 403.
187. 575 A.2d at 408. The court stated that the level of funding must provide for
the special needs of students in poorer urban districts. Id. In addition, the court ex-
pressly limited its finding of an inefficient education only to certain poorer districts. Id.
at 409.
188. Id. at 408-09. The court held that the legislative remedy must provide poorer
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for New Jersey students. 1 9
B. Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby - Edgewood I
The Texas Supreme Court also had an opportunity to address the
constitutionality of a school financing plan revised by the Texas Legis-
lature. Following the initial decision in Edgewood Independent School
District v. Kirby (Edgewood 1)190 striking down Texas' education fi-
nancing system, the State legislature enacted Senate Bill 1 on June 7,
1990.191 Immediately following the enactment of the new law, the
plaintiffs in Edgewood I brought an action seeking a declaration that
the system remained unconstitutional.192 The district court found
that, notwithstanding the changes in the statute, the new financing plan
was unconstitutional. 93 Despite this finding, the district court vacated
the injunction granted in Edgewood I by the Texas Supreme Court and
denied plaintiffs any further relief.194
The Texas Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitu-
tionality of Senate Bill 1.19' The court in Edgewood Independent
School District v. Kirby (Edgewood 11) 196 found that the main improve-
ment in the plan was the legislature's ability to evaluate fund alloca-
tions biennially.197 Although this monitoring effort was a positive step,
the Edgewood 11 court found that the system remained unconstitu-
tional.198 The Edgewood I court initially struck down the plan because
districts a budget "that is approximately equal to the average" budget of the richer
districts. Id.
189. Id.
190. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). See supra notes 136-56 and accompanying text
for discussion of the Edgewood I analysis.
191. Act of June 7, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C. S., ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1. Fol-
lowing the Edgewood I decision, four sessions of the legislature failed to enact the new
funding plan. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I1), 804 S.W.2d 491,
493 n.3 (Tex. 1991). The legislature finally approved a new plan during the fifth special
session which began on May 2, 1990. Id. The governor vetoed this bill on May 22,
1990 and the legislature enacted Senate Bill 1 in the sixth special session. Id.
192. 804 S.W.2d at 493.
193. Id.
194. Id. The district court stated that it would not grant any further relief until it
was obvious that the Texas Legislature would not enact a constitutional funding system
effective September 1, 1991. Id.
195. Id.
196. 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991).
197. Id. at 494-95.
198. Id. at 498.
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it failed to provide "a direct and close correlation between a district's
tax effort and the educational resources available to it." 199 The
Edgewood 11 court found that the amended plan did not alleviate this
structural problem.2"° The court reasoned that the new plan did not
provide students with the efficient educational system guaranteed
under the Texas Constitution.20 1 The court stated that a constitution-
ally efficient system connotes a funding plan that obtains revenue from
all property at substantially similar rates.2 ' 2 As a result, the Edgewood
11 court held that the plan still forced most property owners to bear a
heavier tax burden to fund a less expensive education and was therefore
unconstitutional.20 3
The Texas Supreme Court recognized that it was not within its
power to mandate specific means of adopting an efficient system.2°
This remedy was solely within the powers of the legislature.205 The
court did, however, suggest several methods that could possibly lead to
199. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 397. See supra notes 136-56 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the rationale in Edgewood I.
200. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 496-97.
201. Id. at 498. The court found fault with the revised plan because it retained the
two-tiered structure of the plan overturned in Edgewood I. Id. at 495. The state financ-
ing program guarantees a minimum level of funding per student. Id. The first tier is
the base allotment given to schools to provide a minimum education. Id. The amount
of funding in the first tier is determined by the level of local tax; if a school taxes at a
certain percentage, it is entitled to a base amount from the state. Id. The second tier of
funding is designed to equalize the amount of funds among districts according to their
ability to raise local revenues. Id. The second tier provides the funds to cover the
difference between what the district is able to raise and the state guaranteed level per
student. Id.
The problem with this system is that the program does not begin to cover the neces-
sary costs. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 392. Local districts are still forced to raise a
substantial amount of revenue through the property tax. Id. The new plan offered in
Senate Bill I excluded the top 5% of the wealthiest districts from the formula.
Edgewood I, 804 S.W.2d at 495-96. The court did not address the appropriateness of
the exclusion, but instead concentrated on the material changes in the system since
Edgewood L Id. at 496.
202. Id. at 496-97.
203. Id. at 496. The court stated that the new plan remained inefficient because of
the legislature's overall failure to restructure the system. Id.
204. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 498. The court emphasized that it was not sum-
marily striking down the legislative plan. Id. The court was aware of the difficulty in
devising an efficient educational system. Id. The court reasoned, however, that it had a
constitutional duty to ensure the adherence of the public school system to the constitu-
tionally prescribed standard. Id.
205. Id. at 497.
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a constitutionally efficient system." s First, the Texas Supreme Court
suggested that the legislature consolidate school districts to reduce ad-
ministrative costs. 20 7 Second, the court suggested taxing the districts
at a similar rate in order to give the system additional revenue for
education.208
The Edgewood II court also suggested realigning school districts as a
positive step toward an efficient educational system.2°9 The court rec-
ognized the legislature's authority to arrange school districts according
to county lines. 210 The court reasoned that revenue derived from a
county-wide tax base could then be distributed equally among all
schools within the county.21 1
The Edgewood II court affirmed the district court's conclusion that
the new system was not in compliance with Article VII, section 1 of the
Texas Constitution.21 2 In addition, the Texas Supreme Court found
that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to enforce the
Edgewood I injunction.2 13 The Edgewood II court reinstated the in-
junction and ordered the Texas Legislature to take action to remedy
the defect.2 14
206. Id. at 496-97.
207. Id. at 497.
208. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 497. The court reasoned that the varying tax rates
lead to a failure to maximize tax revenue. Id. at 496-97. If richer districts were taxed at
a level similar to poorer districts, the state could raise millions of dollars of additional
revenue. Id. at 497. Equalizing the tax rates may ease the state's burden or lower a
district's tax rate. Whatever the result, the court believed that this proposal would lead
to an efficient system. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 497-98. The court stated that the Texas Constitution grants the legisla-
ture broad discretion in the creation of school districts. Id. at 497. Article VII, section
3 of the Texas Constitution authorizes the legislature to organize school districts "com-
posed of territory wholly within a county or in parts of two or more counties." Tux.
CoNsT. art. VII, § 3.
211. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 497. The court did, however, express concern
that the proposed tax base consolidation system may pose constitutional problems. Id.
The court cited its decision in Love v. City of Dallas, 40 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1931), in
which it held that the legislature cannot compel a district to levy taxes and provide an
education for non-resident students. 40 S.W.2d at 27.
212. Edgewood I, 804 S.W.2d at 498.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 498-99.
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
342 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 42:311
IV. THE IMPACT OF RECENT DECISIONS AND THE FUTURE OF
REFORM LITIGATION
The recent state court decisions striking down their school financing
plans have once again thrust financing reform into the spotlight of na-
tional concern.215 The courts' sole reliance on their states' education
articles represents a marked shift in school finance reform decisions.216
Only two decisions had relied exclusively on the state education article
prior to the recent trend triggered by the Helena, Rose, and Edgewood
decisions.217 Previously, most courts relied, at least in part, on state
equal protection guarantees assessing school financing plans.218
The shift from the Equal Protection Clause to the state education
article should create new hope for reformists. 219 The recent decisions
indicate that a court can strike down a funding plan more easily under
the state education article than under the equal protection provi-
sions.22° Decisions dealing with a state education article are usually
limited in scope; their impact has been restricted to the state education
system.221 Concentrating on the states' education article does not set a
dangerous precedent, whereas a decision labeling education as a funda-
mental right or creating wealth as a suspect class could have a great
impact on other areas of law.222 Judges will obviously tread carefully
215. THE STRUCTURE OF STATE AID, supra note 3, at vii-viii.
216. See generally Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 13, at 238-49 (discussing the
impact of Helena, Rose, and Edgewood on financial reform for education).
217. See Robinson v. Cahill (1), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I
v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). See supra notes 46-69 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Robinson I. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Seattle Sch. Dist.
218. See supra note 73 for cases that relied on state equal protection guarantees
(excluding Seattle Sch. Dist.).
219. See Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 13, at 243-249 for a discussion of the
categories of the state education articles and their significance to the success of reform
litigation.
220. For courts assessing constitutionality claims under their state education arti-
cles, see generally Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989);
Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Abbott v. Burke, 575
A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.
1989); and Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (II), 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991).
221. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 13, at 241.
222. Id. at 241-42. As evident from the scant success school reformists experienced
prior to 1989, courts are reluctant to apply equal protection analysis to education. Id.
at 240-41. The primary reason for this reluctance is due to the hesitation of many
courts to classify wealth as a suspect class. Id. at 241-42. As Thro stated, this concern




Another reason reformists may cheer is that they can take advantage
of today's current societal views on education. Educational improve-
ment is a high priority in America today.22 3 Under an equal protection
analysis, a court's freedom is limited by the standard that heightened
social importance shall not be considered in determining fundamental-
ity. 24 When analyzing a state education article, however, judicial
opinions may be affected by current societal views. At a minimum, our
current educational problems will be on the judge's mind when he is
evaluating the framer's intent and the importance attributed to
education.
Over the past twenty-five years, educational expenditures have in-
creased, while students' average scores on standardized tests have
steadily decreased.22 Clearly, simply throwing money at our educa-
tional problems without reforming the financing system is not the an-
swer. The court in Abbott v. Burke recognized that there are inherent
societal problems that lead to unequal opportunities for our chil-
dren.226 The New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized the important
role education plays in reducing these inequalities.227 The court
tion arena. A decision rendering wealth as a suspect class or education as a fundamen-
tal right could have far reaching effects, invalidating many state programs. Id. at 242.
223. In 1989, President Bush held an "Education Summit Conference" for our na-
tion's governors in Charlottesville, Virginia. The President and the governors left the
conference with six goals for education. By the year 2000:
*all children in America will start school ready to learn.
*the high school graduation rate will increase to at least 90 percent.
*... every school in America will ensure that all students learn to use their
minds well, so that they will be prepared for responsible citizenship, further learn-
ing, and productive employment in our modem economy.
*U.S. students will be first in the world in science and mathematics achievement.
*every adult American will be literate and possess the knowledge and skills nec-
essary to compete in a global economy and exercise the rights and responsibilities
of citizenship.
*every school in America will be free of drugs and violence and will offer a
disciplined environment conducive to learning.
Six Goals for Year 2000, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 2, 1991, at 14.
224. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (finding
that education's importance will not cause the court to stray from its standard of re-
view). See supra note 41 and accompanying text for discussion of this standard.
225. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 366 (N.J. 1990) (finding poorer students'
education inadequate despite monumental per pupil expenditures).
226. Id. at 384-86.
227. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text for the Abbott court's
reasoning.
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shifted its analysis away from monetary input and concentrated on the
quality of educational output.22 The Abbott court recognized, how-
ever, that there is a direct relationship between the amount of money
invested in education and its resulting quality.229 It is apparent that
the lack of quality output - education - clearly calls for reform in
the methods of input - school financing.
Disparity in property wealth exists; it is embedded in our society.230
There will always be a class structure - the rich and the poor. The
true inequity in school financing lies in the disparities in tax efforts
among the richer and poorer districts.2 31 Many current systems re-
quire a minimum funding level to ensure an "adequate" education.232
Under these programs, the State supplements poorer school districts
that cannot raise the minimum level of funding through local tax reve-
nues.2 33 Unfortunately, this system does not alleviate the inequality in
available funds. Wealthier districts have the luxury of raising money
well in excess of the minimum funding level while maintaining a lower
tax rate than poorer districts. 234 However, poorer districts, already
overwhelmed by the costs of providing other essential public services,
must maintain excessive tax rates in order to attempt to meet the mini-
mum level. Thus, the disparity in the quality of education among
richer and poorer districts persists under this system.235
Increased state responsibility in providing funds appears to be a po-
tential avenue of success to battle the disparities in school financing.
As the court in Edgewood II suggested, an efficient educational system
mandates that each district tax at the same rate.236 Currently, because
of the varying property values, richer districts are taxed at a lower rate
than poorer districts. Consequently, millions of dollars are lost.237 If
228. See supra notes 164-75 and accompanying text for discussion of the concentra-
tion on the quality of education.
229. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 387.
230. See supra notes 21, 128, 135, and 140-41 for examples of the disparity in prop-
erty wealth among districts.
231. See supra notes 140-41.
232. For a description of state plans which utilize the minimum funding level, see
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 377-81 (N.J. 1990); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v.
Kirby (II), 804 S.W.2d 491, 495 (Tex. 1991).
233. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 377-81; Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 495.
234. See supra note 141 for an example of this inequality.
235. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 394.
236. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 496-97 (Tex. 1991).
237. Id. at 497.
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all districts were taxed at the same rate, states could garner millions
more in revenue for education.23 It is unlikely that state constitutions
would allow local tax revenues to be collected for use throughout the
state;239 however, the legislature may realign school districts in order
to decrease the current disparities among districts.2" The court in
Edgewood II recommended a realignment of school district bounda-
ries.24 If the legislature realigned according to county lines, for exam-
ple, a county-wide tax could replace separate local district taxes.
Consequently, all the revenue collected would then be divided equally
among the school districts.242 Because a county may currently consist
of many poor and wealthy districts, this method would alleviate the
differences in educational opportunities among districts. Moreover,
this same procedure could be extended by using the entire state as a
single tax base.24a
238. Id.
239. The constitutional analysis of allowing states to collect local taxes is beyond
the scope of this Note. Briefly, however, the court in Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Kirby (III), No. D-0378, 1991 Tex. LEXIS 21, at *2 (Tex. Feb. 25, 1991) stated that the
Texas Constitution mandated "that local tax revenue is not subject to state-wide
recapture."
240. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 497-98. In response to Edgewood II, the Texas
legislature enacted Senate Bill 351. Instead of consolidating school districts, the Texas
legislature artificially consolidated the taxing power by forming 188 county education
districts. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
(Edgewood IV), No. D-1469, 1992 Tex. LEXIS 7, at 20 (Tex. Jan. 30, 1992). Although
the state argued that it was merely following the Edgewood II court's proposal, the
Texas Supreme Court struck down Senate Bill 351 as unconstitutional in Edgewood IV.
Id. at 59. The court had difficulty with the plan because taxpayers were obligated to
support the costs of schools in other districts over which they had no control. Id. at 58.
The Edgewood IV court held that the state cannot unilaterally impose tax base consoli-
dation without voter approval. Id. School district consolidation and taxing power con-
solidation are distinguishable. Under the former, taxpayers still have control over the
schools their funds are supporting, even though this control is greatly diluted.
241. Id. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of district
realignment.
242. Id.
243. Kosterlitz, supra note 2, at 1768. Some commentators have argued that there
may be a need for federal action. Professor Allen Odden of the University of Southern
California stated that "[w]e have to question now the way we've traditionally imple-
mented local control ... There's a growing realization among all sectors and educators
that education is key to increased [economic] strength and survival. We still want local
school implementation [of education policies], but there's a growing consensus that we
need nationwide goals." Id. There has been congressional activity in response to these
concerns. Legislation has been introduced which would require states that receive fed-
eral aid to provide equality among their school districts. Id. In the past, federal activity
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The affluent school districts will obviously disagree with this
method, arguing that the new alignment is taking both money and con-
trol away from the traditional source of educational revenue - the
localities. 2" Under the proposed system, a locality would be entitled
to a fixed percentage of the total revenue raised throughout the county.
An affluent community would raise much more money than it would
receive for its educational budget, whereas a poorer district would re-
ceive more funding than it raises. The new plan would also place, in
effect, a cap on the amount of money a locality could expend on its
schools. 245 If an affluent locality desired to raise its educational ex-
penditures, a currently routine tax increase of one percent would have
to be approved by the entire county. Arguably, this effect would result
in a spiraling downward of educational standards.246 Although the
proposed standard levels the playing field, the wealthier districts will
argue that the playing field has actually been lowered, sacrificing the
educational opportunities available to their children.
Currently, the inequities present in our educational systems sacrifice
the educations of children in poor urban districts while children in
wealthier areas enjoy financing adequate to provide a "thorough and
efficient" education. Clearly, these inequities must be resolved. The
realignment of districts proposed by the Texas Supreme Court will not
result in a "spiraling downward" of educational standards. Instead,
realignment will result in a system where children in poorer areas re-
ceive the same educational opportunities found in wealthier districts.
Moreover, the realignment will not hinder students in the wealthier
school districts. Although citizens in wealthier areas will have to pay a
tax rate higher than they are currently paying, the size of the new
county-wide tax base should garner revenues sufficient for wealthier
areas to maintain their current programs. Furthermore, the percentage
paid by the entire county will be lower than the rate currently paid by
citizens in poorer districts. An increased tax rate for citizens in wealth-
ier districts should not be difficult to implement where the education of
our children is at stake.
looked not only to ensuring equality within the states, but also equality between them.
Both Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy proposed such systems,
but neither were seriously considered. Edward B. Fiske, Historic Shift Seen in School
Finance, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 4, 1989, at B9.






Although the current state systems rely heavily on local control and
local revenue raising, the state is the entity most responsible for educa-
tion.247 Nearly all state education articles include the phrase "the
state shall provide for a school system."24 It is possible that our na-
tion has reached the point where it is no longer efficient to leave our
decisions to the localities. These current educational systems were im-
plemented in the nineteenth century when the population was propor-
tionate throughout the state. Twentieth century urbanization created
densely populated areas, resulting in poor, disadvantaged neighbor-
hoods. This unequal growth renders the current system unworkable.
Perhaps it is time for the states to ignore tradition and reform our edu-
cational financing systems.
John W. Lawrence, Jr.*
247. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text for an example of a state consti-
tution granting the responsibility for education to the state.
248. See supra note 96 for citations to several state constitutions' education articles.
* J.D. 1992, Washington University.
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